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 Non-technical Summary 
Contractual and regulatory provisions for access affect incentives to invest in an up-
graded network and, in particular, a next-generation access network. Investment deci-
sions are made under uncertainty and have to be made over time. This papers provides 
a framework for taking uncertainty, risk aversion, and the timing of investment explicitly 
into account. First, it evaluates various access price policies in a framework in which the 
incremental value over the legacy network is uncertain. Second, introducing risk aver-
sion, the access price structure turns out to be critical for the risk profile of the investing 
telecom operator and of the access-seeking alternative operator. Third, some implica-
tions of the time structure of access payments are derived. 
Keywords: NGA, investment under uncertainty, access price rule, telecommunications 
 Das Wichtigste in Kürze  
Vertragliche und regulatorische Zugangsbestimmungen beeinflussen die Anreize eines 
Netzbetreibers, in ein leistungsfähigeres Netz zu investieren. Dies gilt insbesondere für 
`next-generation access networks´. Investitionsentscheidungen müssen unter Unsi-
cherheit über die Zeit hinweg getroffen werden. Diese Arbeit entwickelt einen Modell-
rahmen, innerhalb dessen Unsicherheit über die zukünftige Marktentwicklung, Risiko-
aversion der Marktteilnehmer sowie Investitionsentscheidungen im Zeitablauf explizit 
berücksichtigt. In einem ersten Schritt werden unterschiedliche Zugangsbestimmungen 
hinsichtlich der Investitionsanreize unter der Hypothese bewertet, dass der inkrementel-
le Wert der Investition gegenüber dem bestehenden Netz unsicher ist. In einem zweiten 
Schritt wird Risikoaversion der Netzbetreiber eingeführt. Hierbei wird bestimmt, wie die 
Struktur der Zugangspreise das Risikoprofil des investierenden und des Zugang su-
chenden Netzbetreibers bestimmt. In einem dritten Schritt werden Investitionen im Zeit-
ablauf betrachtet und Implikationen der zeitlichen Struktur der Zugangspreise abgelei-
tet. 
Schlagwörter: NGA, Investitionen unter Unsicherheit, Zugangspreise, Zugangsregulie-
rung, Telekommunikation 
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2 Uncertainty, investments and regulation of NGA 
 
1. Introduction 
Uncertainty about the success of an investment is arguably an important obstacle to the 
roll-out of fibre networks and other investments to upgrade an existing network. In par-
ticular, investments in next-generation access networks are associated with highly un-
predictable future profits after making the investment. Policy makers have acknowl-
edged this. In particular, the European Commission has observed that Europe lags be-
hind the U.S. and Asia in such developments. The European Commission states: 
 
There are several reasons, the most evident being the uncertain commercial vi-
ability of substantial network investments, due to prevailing investment models 
and the EU market structure. But also because of doubts about consumers' 
short-term willingness to pay more for higher speeds, as new high value-added 
digital content and services are not necessarily available yet throughout the EU. 
. . .4  
 
This quote also highlights the importance of the uncertain development of complemen-
tary services made feasible by the new technology, as well as consumers’ uncertain 
take-up of these services. An investment’s profitability also depends, more generally, on 
the speed of market penetration since the investment, for the most part, constitutes a 
sunk cost, and an efficient roll-out relies on quick take-up.5 While there may be immedi-
ate revenues, profitability depends crucially on a continuous revenue stream over a long 
period. This long time horizon tends to further increase the uncertainty that the investing 
party faces.  
Uncertainty over the key parameters of a firm’s decision and its implications also plays 
an important role in the modern theory of regulation. A large part of the literature con-
siders private information held by the party that is subject to regulation.6 For example, a 
regulator may have to set access prices without perfectly knowing the cost function of 
the regulated firm. While this is a relevant issue, this paper will abstract from private 
information of this type. We focus, instead, on uncertainty about a new technology’s 
potential. This uncertainty has direct implications for the way that particular regulatory 
interventions affect market outcomes. For instance, the regulator may oblige the invest-
ing network operator to grant access at a given fixed fee. Whether other firms will make 
use of this possible access is uncertain, as it depends on the utility that consumers de-
 4 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, The Digital Agenda for Europe - Driv-
ing European growth digitally, December 18, 2012, COM(2012) 784 final, page 8. 
 5 A high degree of uncertainty may already have been relevant at an earlier point in the development of 
local telecommunications networks. Pindyck (2007) emphasizes the relevance of uncertainty for such 
investments. However, some economists have challenged the general presumption that the network 
operator suffers from uncertainty; see Economides (2002). 
 6 For instance, Armstrong and Sappington (2007) provide an overview. 
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rive from additional services associated with the investment. Thus, at the moment of 
making the investment, its overall value depends both directly on its success with con-
sumers and indirectly on the possibility of passing on costs to other firms. The extent to 
which this is possible depends, in turn, on the access regulation that is in place. This 
issue does not arise without uncertainty. 
A key aspect in our analysis is the non-investing firm’s decision of whether or not to use 
the new technology under the prevailing access conditions. More generally, it has to 
decide the extent and the timing of offering the new technology to its consumers. Effi-
cient regulation increases the probability that another firm will use the new technology 
early (here, we abstract from limited capacity). If firms use the new technology symmet-
rically, then competition in each downstream market is intense. This tends to lead to a 
high consumer surplus and only small allocative inefficiencies, measured by a small 
deadweight loss. This observation hints at an important disadvantage of fixed access 
fees, which are optional in the sense that access-seeking firms decide after the invest-
ment whether they are interested in accessing the new technology. The inefficiency 
may be reduced if the payment for access depends on the quantity of the access prod-
uct that the access-seeking firm demands. However, introducing such variable access 
fees may lead to higher retail prices, on average. Thus, we find a trade-off between 
fixed and variable optional access fees. This trade-off might be attenuated by using 
general, non-linear tariffs. Also, from a social perspective, access fees that condition on 
relevant changes in market characteristics may be preferable to those that do so only 
indirectly. 
As an extreme alternative, we also discuss a fixed non-conditional upfront fee, which 
removes the optionality of the access payment. The marginal price of obtaining access 
can then be set equal to the corresponding marginal costs. With this regulatory policy, 
however, one should bear in mind several caveats. Most obviously, if, at the moment of 
the investment, the access-seeking firm does not yet exist, the mechanism is simply not 
applicable. Further, the fixed fee should be based on the expected demand of the ac-
cess-seeking firm, if this is feasible. A policy that applies a fee to all firms indiscriminate-
ly will not allow small firms to operate profitably in the market. Finally, an induced high 
degree of competition, while being desirable from an ex post perspective, could lead to 
underinvestment or inefficiently postponed investment from a social welfare perspec-
tive. Apart from the access price rules mentioned above, alternative solutions exist. For 
instance, an access-seeking firm may acquire the option to obtain access under prede-
fined conditions. This allows for a combination of optional and non-optional fixed pay-
ments. Also, the contract or the regulatory rule may specify certain quantities for which 
preferential access can be obtained by making a non-optional upfront payment. When a 
wait-and-see strategy becomes more attractive for the access-seeking firm, it may use 
the new technology rather late, to the detriment of social welfare. Then, the time struc-
ture of the access tariff may be used to improve dynamic efficiency by providing incen-
tives for earlier and more-intensive use of the new technology. We discuss when non-
4 Uncertainty, investments and regulation of NGA 
linear tariffs based on access levels and front-loaded access tariffs can increase wel-
fare. 
As a final contribution, we discuss the optimal allocation of risk between firms. The allo-
cation of risk depends, for example, on the degree to which the access of the non-
investing firm remains optional and on the use of fixed fees versus incremental, usage-
based payments. The allocation of risk may matter for efficiency, in particular, when 
firms appear to be averse even with respect to idiosyncratic risk—e.g., as they have 
limited access to capital markets. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the formal frame-
work. Section 3 considers firms’ optimal investment and contractual choice, as well as 
the impact of various access policies. Section 4 introduces optimal risk-sharing, while 
Section 5 provides an extension to a dynamic investment path. Section 6 concludes.  
Guide to the literature: This paper complements the analysis of Inderst and Peitz 
(2012a, 2012b), which investigates firms’ incentives to invest in a new technology when 
starting with an old technology (i.e., a legacy network). Others also have looked at this 
issue. For a recent survey, see Cambini and Jiang (2009). A recent addition to the liter-
ature is Nitsche and Wiethaus (2011), a welfare assessment of the effect of access 
rules on the incumbent's investment incentives. Other recent work includes Brito, Perei-
ra and Vareda (2012) and Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan (2012), which consider the 
migration from old to new technology and the role of access rules. Less closely related 
are studies that investigate the effects of access prices on the outcome of dynamic in-
vestment races (e.g., Hori and Mizuno, 2006; Vareda and Hoernig, 2010). 
The contribution of this paper is to explore the role of uncertainty in investments and 
retail prices, distinguishing among various types of access contracts. We distinguish, in 
particular, among access contracts that are signed prior to investment and commit to 
payments (co-investments); those that are signed prior to investment but in which pay-
ments by one firm are optional; and those that are signed after a firm has made the in-
vestment. Our paper also complements Bourreau, Cambini, and Hoernig (2013), which 
looks at co-investment under uncertainty in a setting with a continuum of regional mar-
kets.7  
2. The model 
This paper builds on Inderst and Peitz (2012a). In the main text, we adopt a reduced-
form presentation; in the Appendix, we develop a specific model that satisfies all of our 
 7 Since Bourreau, Cambini, and Hoernig (2012) allow for perfect price discrimination across regional 
markets, a model with a single market extends to a market with a continuum of regional markets in a 
straightforward way, as long as costs are linear in the number of markets. However, they postulate 
that these costs are strictly convex, which makes the analysis of coverage meaningful. 
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reduced-form assumptions in the main text and, thus, provides a micro-foundation of 
our approach. 
2.1 Model under certainty 
We consider a duopoly model with firms 2,1=i . Firm 1  is the only firm that may under-
take an investment. In an otherwise symmetric environment, we consider markets in 
which network duplication is not economically feasible—i.e., a situation of natural mo-
nopoly with respect to the new technology. We largely abstract from other asymmetries 
that may contribute to an incumbency advantage (for a focus on asymmetries, albeit in 
an environment with certainty, we refer the reader to Inderst and Peitz, 2012b). The 
ensuing price competition between operators is explicitly modeled in the Appendix—
see, also, Inderst and Peitz (2012a). Firm i ’s profits are denoted by ),( 21 uuiπ where iu  
denotes the gross utility delivered by firm i .  
Absent additional investments, we postulate that both firms offer the same service; they 
both have access to a legacy network. As a measure of network quality and, thus, con-
sumer gross utility, we have Ou . Superscript O  stands for the old technology. Without 
any investment, firms obtain profits ),(1
OO uuπ  and  ),(2
OO uuπ , respectively. 
In Inderst and Peitz (2012a), we consider an investment that can be made at cost iI  
and that increases the quality and associated utility from Ou  to ON uu >  (where super-
script N  stands for the new technology). The investment can be made by one or both 
firms. To offer services with this quality for all consumers, it is not necessarily required 
that both operators invest. If the investing firm grants access to the other firm, both firms 
can offer the high quality available with the new technology. In the following, we are 
interested mainly in the case in which exactly one operator—i.e., operator 1=i —
invests. 
If the other firm 2=i  does not obtain access, profits (gross of the investment cost for 
firm 1) are  ),(1
ON uuπ  and  ),(2
ON uuπ . Note that we postulate that firm 2 continues to 
have access to the old technology, although this may not be true if that access is 
through, for instance, an unbundling agreement, and the interconnection points are by-
passed when investing in the new technology. We elaborate on this issue in Inderst and 
Peitz (2012b) but abstract from it in this paper. The difference from the status quo is 
that firm 1 offers the better technology with its additional services such that ON uu > . 
Thus, firm 1 obtains a higher gross profit than in the status quo, 
 ),( ),( 11
OOON uuuu ππ > , while firm 2 obtains a lower profit,  ),(),( 22
OOON uuuu ππ < . 
Subtracting the investment cost , firm 1 makes a net profit of  ),(1 Iuu
ON −π . 
If, however, firm 2 obtains access at marginal costs to firm 1’s high-quality network, 
profits gross of any investment costs and transfers are  ),(1
NN uuπ  and  ),(2
NN uuπ . 
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Profits depend on the access agreement or access regulation, as we will elaborate on 
below. 
2.2 Modeling uncertainty 
We introduce uncertainty about the value of the investment by making Nu a random 
variable. This reflects the uncertainty about the availability and quality of new services 
for which the new technology is required. Initially, firms have to form expectations about 
Nu ; the expected value is denoted by ][ NuE . 
We postulate that Nu  can take any value between Ou  and some upper bound u . If 
ON uu = , consumers do not derive any additional utility from using the new technology. 
Furthermore, we postulate that variable costs are the same for the old and new tech-
nologies. Hence, for any strictly positive difference ON uu − , the new technology will be 
used if available. Cost differences could, however, be easily incorporated. 
If firm 1 has invested in and uses the new technology while restricting access, its ex-
pected net profit is 
.)],([ 1 IuuE
ON −π      (1) 
When firm 2=i  does not obtain access and, thus, continues to use the old technology 
Ouu =2 , its expected profit is )],([ 2
ON uuE π . If access is granted or if investment costs 
are shared, profits will be different. These profits will be analyzed in the following sec-
tion when we consider various alternative regulatory policies. 
3. Risk-neutral firms and investments 
In this section, we analyze a market in which firms are risk-neutral. For simplicity, we 
also abstract from the timing of the investment and the dependence of profits on the 
timing decision. Thus, only the levels of investment costs and expected profits have to 
be considered. 
Looking at both access-seeking and access-granting firms, we investigate the role of 
uncertainty for the evaluation of different regulatory policies and contracting environ-
ments. We distinguish between optional and non-optional payments for access. With 
regard to the former, the access-seeking firm can decide whether to seek access after 
the investment (and after the uncertainty has been resolved). With regard  to the latter, 
the access-seeking firm enters a binding agreement before undertaking the investment 
and cannot simply walk away when the market environment turns out to be unfavorable. 
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The second distinction concerns the access price structure with linear tariff and fixed 
tariff as extreme cases and non-linear price structures as intermediate cases. 
3.1  Non-optional fixed fees 
Our simplest benchmark case is a non-optional fixed access price F  that the access-
seeking firm has to pay to the access-granting firm (in addition to a marginal usage fee 
equal to marginal cost). Thus, F  implements a particular cost sharing determined by 
regulation or through negotiations between the two firms. More precisely, the access-
seeking firm contributes F  , and the access-granting firm contributes FI − . The fixed 
payment may depend on the expected usage of the new technology and on the bar-
gaining power of the two firms. We will return to this issue below.  
If the investment is made and both firms use the new technology, profits are 
 ),( NNi uuπ . The equilibrium then implements the same allocation as in a situation in 
which both firms invest, but with the difference that the duplication of fixed costs is 
avoided. 
Investment incentives 
We next address the question of whether the investment will be undertaken. Here, we 
distinguish between two scenarios. In the first scenario, the investment is not profitable 
when firm 2 continues to use the old technology. In the second scenario, the contrary 
holds. In the first scenario, when the two parties reach no agreement, no investment 
takes place. In the second scenario, firm 1 will invest regardless. 
Scenario 1 prevails if 
).,()],([ 11
OOON uuIuuE ππ <−     (2) 
Both firms agree with the cost sharing if 
),()()],([ 11
OONN uuFIuuE ππ ≥−− and    (3) 
).,()],([ 22
OONN uuFuuE ππ ≥−       
This can be satisfied only if industry profits satisfy 
)].,(),([)],(),([ 2121
OOOONNNN uuuuEIuuuuE ππππ +≥−+    (4) 
Otherwise, one cannot find a contract with cost sharing ),( FFI −  that is agreeable to 
both firms. Whether inequality (4) holds depends on the required investment level I  and 
the likelihood that high levels of Nu  are realized. It also depends on how the new tech-
nology affects total demand and competition. The basic model developed in the Appen-
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dix has the feature that total industry profits are independent of the technology in use, 
which implies that inequality (4) is not satisfied in that model. Thus, demand expansion 
or less competitive pressure as a result of the investment is required for inequality (4) to 
hold. 
More-intense competition makes it more likely that we are in scenario 2, satisfying 
).,()],([ 11
OOON uuIuuE ππ ≥−      (5) 
Here, the investment is profitable for firm 1 if the new technology is not shared with firm 
2. With more-intense competition, demand reacts more strongly to price changes (i.e., 
there is a strong business-stealing effect), and firm 1 can play out its technological ad-
vantage. With intense competition and a low elasticity of total demand—so that there 
are no benefits from market expansion that can be shared—firm 2 will neither obtain 
access nor duplicate the investment. These findings are in line with what is obtained 
under certainty and, thus, do not merit the statement of a formal result. 
Cost sharing and usage 
We next address the question of how costs should be shared, provided that there is an 
agreement, and how uncertainty impacts the expected profits under such cost-sharing 
rules. 
A reasonable rule for distributing the investment cost between the two firms is to base 
cost sharing on the expected usage of the technology—i.e., the expected number of 
subscribers for each firm. Given the realization Nu , we denote the number of subscrib-
ers of the two firms by ),(1
NN uuq  and ),(2
NN uuq . (For a particular specification of the-
se demand functions, we again refer the reader to the Appendix.) Denoting expected 
demand by ][ 1qE  and ][ 2qE , we obtain cost sharing according to fully distributed costs 
,
][][
][
21
1 I
qEqE
qEF
+
=      (6) 
and 
I
qEqE
qEFI
][][
][
21
2
+
=−  
for the two firms. 
We note that this cost-sharing rule does not necessarily satisfy the participation con-
straint (3) in scenario 1, even though a different distribution might exist that does satisfy 
it. More precisely, we can always find such a distribution )','( FIF −  if inequality (4) is 
satisfied, even if (3) is not satisfied for the rule specified in (6). 
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3.2 Optional fixed fees 
We continue to consider access provision for a fixed fee. In contrast to the previous 
subsection, we now postulate that firm 2 can opt out after undertaking the investment 
and after Nu  was realized. This means that the non-investing firm makes its decision 
about seeking access after the uncertainty has been resolved (while the optional con-
tract is signed prior to the realization Nu ). 
Inefficiency after an investment 
Making the demand for access conditional on the realization of Nu introduces a possible 
inefficiency. We note that, given the investment in the new technology, it is always so-
cially efficient that both firms use the new technology. However, it is not necessarily 
privately optimal for firm 2 to obtain such access because the conditions of access are 
not favorable for it. Paying the fixed access fee F  is optimal for firm 2 only if 
).,(),( 22
ONNN uuFuu ππ ≥−     (7) 
We consider markets in which ),(2
NN uuπ  is weakly increasing in Nu  (see the Appen-
dix for details): This means that profits do not decrease if the new technology and the 
associated services turn out to be more attractive for consumers. By contrast, if firm 2 
continues to use the old technology, its profit ),(2
ON uuπ  is postulated to be decreasing 
in the attractiveness of the new technology Nu .8 Since the left-hand side of (7) is weak-
ly increasing in Nu  and the right-hand side is decreasing, there is, at most, one inter-
section point. With the appropriate boundary behavior, there is a unique critical value 
*uuN =  at which (7) is satisfied with equality. For all realizations *uu N > , firm 2 will 
seek access at price F , while for all realizations *uu N < , it prefers not to use the new 
technology. This leads to an inefficiency in the use of the new technology: 
Result 1: With an optional fixed access price greater than zero, a given investment is 
inefficiently used because the firm that may want to ask for access decides not to do so 
if the new technology turns out to be not sufficiently superior to the old technology. 
The optionality that firm 2 enjoys has the consequence that after a bad realization of 
Nu , firm 2 continues to use the old technology, and only firm 1, which has sunk its in-
vestment cost, uses the new technology, although it would be socially efficient if both 
firms did. For all realizations *uu N < , firm 1 is the only firm that offers the new technol-
ogy. This tends to give rise to an additional inefficiency, as the resulting asymmetry of 
firms may reduce competition. Thus, consumer surplus also may suffer. 
 8 We also note that this property is not always satisfied: This may happen if consumers are sufficiently 
heterogeneous with respect to their preference for the old versus the new technology. With such verti-
cal differentiation, the firm with the old technology may benefit if the new technology becomes more 
attractive, as this reduces competition by increasing differentiation. 
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The investing firm shares part of the investment cost with positive probability—namely, 
with the probability that Nu  is greater than *u , *]Pr[ uu N ≥ . Thus, the expected contri-
bution to costs is 
*].Pr[ uuFf N ≥⋅=       
To share a particular fraction of the total investment cost, it becomes necessary to in-
crease F  beyond the level with a non-optional fee. However, the larger F is, the larger 
is the critical value )(* Fu , which is implicitly defined by )*,(*)*,( 22
OuuFuu ππ =− . 
This again pushes up the level F  that is necessary to realize a given f , and so on. 
Ultimately, it may, then, not be feasible at all to share costs in this way. 
Investment incentives 
Our preceding analysis has immediate implications for firm 1’s investment incentives. In 
particular, it may not be possible with optional fees to provide sufficient investment in-
centives for firm 1. If firm 2 does not use the new technology for realizations *uuN ≤ , 
this also reduces the rent that the investing firm can potentially extract. (Also, the inten-
sity of competition matters; we return to this issue below.) 
Due to the optionality to access, firm 2 will necessarily obtain a positive net surplus. 
This implies that it is impossible for firm 1 to extract all the rents that are generated 
through the investment. More precisely, firm 2 is, at *uuN = , indifferent about whether 
it should pay F and obtain access to the new technology. For any realization *uuN > , 
it does strictly better by obtaining access. Thus, the expected rent is strictly positive. 
There is, however, a countervailing force. So far, we have considered only rents at the 
wholesale level of firm 1 and have not evaluated the consequences for downstream 
competition. In particular, for all realizations *uuN < , firm 1’s market power increases 
relative to an environment in which firm 2 always has access to the new technology; in 
a sense, a high fixed fee partially forecloses the market for firm 2. This leads to higher 
downstream profit. If symmetric competition is intense and the price elasticity of total 
demand low, firm 1 might actually realize higher profits if it does not share the technolo-
gy, even though it foregoes additional wholesale revenues. 
 
3.3 Ex-post contracts with a fixed fee 
So far, we have restricted ourselves to a conceptual discussion of simple ex-ante and 
ex-post (optional) fixed-fee contracts. In what follows, we discuss how these parameters 
are determined with and without regulation and make the respective contractual choices 
more flexible. Inderst and Peitz (2012a) distinguish between ex-ante and ex-post con-
tracts. The latter are negotiated and signed only after the investment is made. In the 
11 
setting with certainty, the range of investment costs for which there is investment in the 
new technology is expanded by allowing for ex-ante contracting. Introducing uncertainty 
in this paper, it is important to determine whether the contracting stage comes before or 
after Nu  has been realized. First, we abstract from regulation and also suppose that Nu  
is already known at the contracting stage. With ex-ante uncertainty, ex-post contracts 
then allow for adjustments to the prevailing market conditions, which tend to reduce or 
even remove inefficiencies in the usage of the new technology. Subsequently, we intro-
duce regulation. 
Flexible cost sharing 
Suppose that, after the investment and after the realization of Nu , firm 1  makes a take-
it-or-leave-it offer to firm 2 . Firm 1  then sets the fixed fee 
).,(),()( 22
ONNNN uuuuuF ππ −=     (8) 
Hence, the investing firm extracts all the value added to firm 2  as a result of obtaining 
access to the new technology. Access is provided whenever industry profits increase 
due to access provision: 
).,(),(),(),( 2121
ONONNNNN uuuuuuuu ππππ +≥+   (9) 
By the preceding remarks, for this inequality to hold, at least one of two properties has 
to be satisfied: a demand expansion effect due to the new technology being made 
available to firm 2  or competition becoming less intense with a better technology. Oth-
erwise, firm 1  will not grant access under conditions that firm 2 will accept, as we will 
discuss below. We note that it is possible, in general, that inequality (8) holds only on a 
subset of ],[ uuO . 
Since the fixed fee has now—through ex-post contracting—indirectly become a function 
of Nu , this “more-flexible” fee )( NuF  can increase efficiency relative to an uncondition-
al ex-ante fee. With a take-it-or-leave-it offer, firm 1  can fully extract the increase in firm 
2 ‘s profit when making the new technology available to its competitor. Its profit is 
)].,(),([),( 221
ONNNNN uuuuuu πππ −+  This implies that firm 1 ’s expected profits from 
the investment are larger than in the setting in which access cannot be provided. Sup-
pose that inequality (9) holds for all feasible Nu . Then, for the investment to be made, 
the expected profit from investing must be larger than the equilibrium profit when not 
investing, 
).,()],(),([),( 1221
OOONNNNN uuIuuEuuEuuE ππππ ≥−−+   (10) 
This defines a critical investment level above which firm 1does not invest. We can now 
compare the investment incentives with ex-post contracts to the ones with non-optional 
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ex-ante contracts. If firm 1  makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer, and we are in scenario 1 
(cf. above), firm 1 ‘s expected profit when investing is 
.)],(),([),( 221 IuuuuEuuE
OONNNN −−+ πππ    (11) 
Since ),(),( 22
ONOO uuEuu ππ > , the expression in (11) is smaller than the left-hand 
side of (10). This implies that there is a larger range of investment costs such that firm 
1  invests under ex-post contracts. The logic is as follows: In scenario 1 and with ex-
ante contracts, firm 2  knows that if it rejects the proposed contract, there will be no 
investment and its profit will be ),(2
OO uuπ . In contrast, with ex-post contracts, firm 1 
has already invested. Therefore, rejecting the proposed ex-post contract implies that 
firm 1  still uses the new technology, with the effect that firm 2  will earn only 
),(2
ON uuπ . Thus, with ex-post contracts, firm 2  is in a weaker position.9 
Result 2: Suppose that with ex-post contracts prescribing a fixed fee, the investing firm 
has all bargaining power. Then, this can provide stronger investment incentives than 
under unconditional ex-ante contracts with a fixed fee. 
Negotiations, hold-up and investment incentives 
The fixed fee F  in (8) has been derived under the assumption that firm 1  has all the 
bargaining power and can, therefore, extract the maximal rent from firm 2 . Yet another 
possibility is that there is a fixed sharing rule based on the two firms’ bargaining power: 
There is Nash bargaining over the gain from access to the technology, so that the sur-
plus gained is shared in equal parts. The values of the outside options of the two firms 
are ),( ONi uuπ , 2,1=i , respectively. The surplus is 
)].,(),([)],(),([ 2121
ONONNNNN uuuuuuuuS ππππ +−+=    
To implement equal surplus sharing, the fee )( NuF  must satisfy 
.2/),()(),( 11 SuuuFuu
ONNNN +=+ ππ  
A hold-up problem may arise in this case: The investing firm has to bear all the invest-
ment costs, which, when negotiations take place, will be sunk and, thus, will not be con-
sidered during the negotiations. This reduces firm 1 ’s incentives to invest. 
Such a hold-up-problem does not arise under ex-ante contracting (i.e., prior to negotia-
tions that take place prior to the investment) or a corresponding regulation of the fee F . 
Comparing the solution under ex-post bargaining with the (optional) ex-ante version, we 
see the following trade-off: On the one hand, through a flexible adjustment )( NuF , the 
 9 Inderst and Peitz (2012a) do not obtain this result, as they focus on situations in which inequality (9) is 
not satisfied. However, it can also be shown under certainty. 
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ex-post contract permits a more efficient outcome with respect to usage. This leads to 
higher industry profits and, thus, has a positive impact on investment incentives. On the 
other hand, efficiency may suffer due to the hold-up problem. 
What this discussion leaves unanswered, however, is the question of whether more- 
flexible ex-ante contracts (or corresponding regulation) could sufficiently improve on the 
ex-ante contracts considered above. We turn to this issue in the following subsection. 
3.4  Flexible ex-ante regulation and flexible ex ante contracts 
In Subsection 3.3, we pointed out that there are stronger investment incentives if the 
firm that decides whether to invest has all the bargaining power. This holds under both 
certainty and uncertainty. If the firm does not have all the bargaining power, the picture 
is more complicated because of a hold-up problem for the investing firm. We also 
showed that ex-post contracts are a good instrument for extracting surplus for the in-
vesting firm in the presence of uncertainty, as they can be conditioned on the realization 
of the random variable. However, in principle, ex-ante contracts can be made more flex-
ible too, allowing them to condition on the realization of the random variable. With ex-
post contracts, it is required only that the realization Nu  is observable. For ex-ante con-
tracts to directly condition on this realization, it is required that Nu  is not only observa-
ble, but also verifiable. The simplest case is, thus, that where Nu  can be directly con-
tracted upon, e.g., via a fee. To avoid allocative inefficiencies, given the considered 
optionality and a reduction of investment incentives, this fee should be increasing in Nu . 
If the market performs better than expected (high Nu ), the fraction of the investment 
cost I  covered through F  increases. This implies that the investing firm has to finance 
a larger part of the investment cost if the realization Nu  turns out to be low. Alternative-
ly, if one wants to condition the fee on the realized profits of the access-seeking firm, a 
possible rule could take the following linear form: 
);,()( 2
NNN uuauF π=     (12) 
i.e., the access-seeking firm has to pay a fraction a  of its gross profit ),(2
NN uuπ  after 
Nu  has been realized. (This involves the ad hoc assumption that firms do not strategi-
cally react and, thus, distort competition in the product market to manipulate the fee 
payment. We turn to the issue of distorted competition in a related setting below.) We 
observe that such a linear rule cannot ensure the efficient adoption of the new technol-
ogy. That would require that the fee is 0 when ON uu = . (However, a modified rule 
)],(),([)( 22
OONNN uuuuauF ππ −=  would satisfy this property.) A fee that does not 
directly condition on Nu , but on profits (as in equation (12)), is no longer a fixed pay-
ment. It depends (non-linearly) on the chosen quantities 1q  and 2q  (number of sub-
scribers). In the next subsection, we consider, instead, a fee that depends linearly on 
these quantities.  
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3.5 Usage-dependent surcharge: Cost sharing with a surcharge 
A special case of a contingent contract is an access fee that linearly depends on us-
age—i.e., the number of subscribers. The access price per subscriber is denoted by w . 
Thus, firm 2  pays for access 2wq . As in the previous subsection, the access price per 
subscriber can be determined ex-post—i.e., after the investment has been made or ex-
ante. Absent any fixed payment, such a payment is always optional, as firm 2  can 
avoid any payment to firm 1  by avoiding enrolling subscribers to the new technology.10 
 
Distorted competition 
If both firms use the new technology—i.e., Ni uu = —and if the access price depends on 
the number of users and is greater than the marginal cost, firm 2  faces a higher mar-
ginal cost than firm 1 . In the linear specification, this is the case if w  is greater than the 
cost of providing the new technology to an additional consumer. Following the idea of 
cost sharing according to usage, in order to determine the level of the access price w , 
one has to make sure that, in expectation, the access-seeking firm pays the fraction of 
the investment cost for access, which corresponds to the fraction of access contracts it 
signs.11 
Since there is a positive margin in the access market, competition is distorted in the 
following way: Firm 2  faces a higher marginal cost, leading to higher prices and a 
weakly smaller quantity. Firm 1  faces a higher opportunity cost: While a lower retail 
price increases its own subscriber number and, thus, locally, its retail revenue, it also 
reduces the number of units sold by the competitor and, thus, firm 1 ‘s revenue in the 
access market. Therefore, both firms have little incentive to set low prices. In the special 
case of constant total demand, there is a one-to-one pass-through of access prices into 
retail prices (see de Bijl and Peitz, 2006). Hence, a linear access rule 2wq  leads to less 
competition and, thus, lower consumer welfare. For elastic total demand, there is also a 
deadweight loss (following from a lower equilibrium quantity). 
However, as discussed in Inderst and Peitz (2012a), comparing a fixed fee F  with a 
price per user  can lead to a trade-off between allocative efficiency and investment 
incentives. The trade-off arises as follows: By setting w  above marginal costs, the al-
locative efficiency is negatively affected if total demand is not constant and is not affect-
10   Note that we consider the choice of technology as a discrete choice—i.e., we do not allow a firm to 
offer a menu of contracts with different technologies to consumers. In the model developed in the Ap-
pendix, all users have the same preferences over different technologies, which justifies our discrete- 
choice assumption. However, more generally, users may have differences in taste with respect to the 
possible technologies, which would make the discrete-choice assumption more restrictive. 
 11 The calculation is more involved than the calculation of F  in (6) since the expected quantities of 1q  
and 2q  have to reflect the adoption probability. 
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ed if total demand is constant. In any case, industry profits increase, which tends to 
increase the expected profitability of the investment since the investing firm might be 
able to appropriate a large fraction of the increase in industry profits.12 By contrast, with 
a fixed fee, industry profits are constant. In the special case of constant total demand, 
investment incentives are stronger with linear access tariffs. With price-dependent de-
mand, the analysis is less straightforward; however, if demand is not very sensitive to 
price, the abovementioned trade-off prevails. 
Efficient adoption of the new technology 
Unlike the analysis with uncertainty in Inderst and Peitz (2012a), there is an efficiency 
argument in favor of a linear access price w  relative to a fixed fee F . Since the total 
access payment 2wq  positively depends on quantity and, thus, on market conditions, 
the adoption of the new technology by firm 2  becomes more likely.13 
Result 3: Uncertainty over Nu  makes the adoption of the new technology by firm 2  
more likely under a linear access fee than under a fixed fee. 
Within our framework, this is seen as follows: Depending on the access price  and 
the expected quantity ),( NNi uuq  , at 
Nu , firm 2  asks for access if 
).,(),();,( 222
ONNNNN uuuuqwwuu ππ ≥⋅−    (13)  
Here, we have introduced the notation );,(2 wuu
NNπ  to capture profits gross of the 
payment for access to the new technology. They still depend on w  since its level af-
fects competition in the retail market. Firm 2 ’s profits when using the old technology are 
on the right-hand side of (13), which are decreasing in Nu . 
Since firm 2  chooses its demand for access by maximizing its profits, the right-hand 
side of (13) is typically strictly increasing in Nu  (for given w ). Thus, with a linear access 
tariff, the access seeker’s profits are positively aligned with market conditions (higher 
Nu ). Thus, from (13), there is a cutoff *u  such that access is requested if *uuN ≥ . A 
key observation is that with a linear access tariff, firm 1  obtains larger access revenues 
for higher realizations of Nu . Therefore, to cover a certain fraction of costs in expecta-
tion, the payment for a lower Nu  can be lower. This reduces the cutoff *u  below which 
firm 2  does not seek access (relative to an optional fixed fee). This has the welfare-
increasing property that firm 2 uses the new technology more “frequently” and works 
 12 A caveat is in order: Absent the additional instrument of a fix fee (or some other non-linear access 
tariffs), it  is possible that while a higher w  reduces the intensity of competition, incremental profits 
(including access revenues) of firm 1 generates lower profits than a fix fee, the reason being that w  
may allow firm 1 to appropriate only small part of the profit increase of firm 2. 
 13 If an access price per subscriber is reached through negotiations instead of through regulation, the 
danger of market foreclosure tends to be reduced (in particular, if the access tariff also includes a 
fixed fee). Recall that investments such that firm 1 does not grant access happen only if industry prof-
its with joint use are less than industry profits when firm 2 does not obtain access. 
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against the negative effect of a higher access price w  on competition between the two 
firms. 
Non-linear usage prices 
By definition, a linear payment for access with the access price w  has the property that 
the marginal cost to enroll an additional user is constant for firm 2 . An alternative is to 
allow for price discrimination between different demand profiles in the access market 
by, for example, allowing quantity discounts for firms that enroll a large number of sub-
scribers. This provides incentives to use the access product to a greater extent. 
In particular, w  may depend on 2q  such that the price per subscriber is decreasing in 
2q : Denoting this price by )( 2qw , this function decreases in 2q . Given a realization 
Nu (since quantities depend on total demand in the retail sector and, thus, on Nu ), the 
deadweight loss would become smaller. Both firms would have an incentive to increase 
their quantities—for firm 1, as the marginal price it obtains from granting access de-
clines, which provides incentives to keep the competitor small; and for firm 2, as the 
marginal opportunity cost of increasing its quantity falls.14 
Such a non-linear access price may run counter to the goal of reducing the payment by 
the access-seeking firm in the case of bad realizations of Nu . This makes it possible 
that the resulting cutoff *u  is lower and, hence, that both firms use the new technology. 
This, again, is due to the property that a low realization of Nu  results in low quantities 
),( NNi uuq .15 A higher realization of 
Nu  increases the average price paid for access, as 
long as )( 2qw  is decreasing in quantity. 
To summarize, an access price )( 2qw that is decreasing in 2q  exhibits two countervail-
ing effects: On the one hand, if firm 2  obtains access to the new technology, the num-
ber of subscribers tends to go up relative to linear access prices. On the other hand, the 
likelihood that firm 2 will use the new technology decreases. It is possible that this 
trade-off, introduced by a quantity discount, can be alleviated through more-complex 
access price tariffs that condition w  not only on the quantity requested by the access-
seeking firm, but also on other observables that depend positively on Nu  (such as prof-
its, in analogy to the access tariff for the fixed fee in equation (12)). 
 14 We abstract from the issue that small competitors may be at a disadvantage as a result of quantity 
discounts at the wholesale level. Thus, we do not include the important long-run issue that the market 
may end up being more concentrated as a result of quantity discounts. 
 15 In the model in the Appendix, this requires that demand in the hinterlands depends on prices. 
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3.6 Alternative access tariffs 
We next further extend the set of considered (non-linear) access tariffs to discuss ac-
cess-price policies (as the outcome of negotiations or regulatory intervention) that also 
play a role in the policy debate. 
Access options 
The investing firm 1 , prior to the investment, may want to sell an access option to firm 
2 . In our framework, this may take the following form: A fixed fee F  to be paid initially 
is non-optional. After the realization of Nu , firm 2 can choose the quantity 2q ; the cor-
responding part of the access payment is optional. 
The advantages and disadvantages of this type of negotiated contract or regulated ac-
cess tariff can be immediately inferred by our preceding analysis. The fixed fee F  re-
duces the inefficiency arising from firm 2’s socially inefficient adoption of the new tech-
nology after Nu  has been realized. However, we recall that fixed ex-ante fees have the 
disadvantage that they exclude firms that enter the market at a later time. In addition, 
barriers of entry may arise for small firms. Furthermore, a higher w  relaxes competition 
in the retail market, but tends to make technology adoption by firm 2  more likely. The 
lessening of competition may be welfare-increasing from a dynamic perspective, as it 
may make the investment profitable for certain levels of I . 
Possibly, offering a menu of access contracts with one contract specifying the access 
option conditional on paying upfront F  allows for cost sharing at an ex-ante stage 
among firms already present in the market, while still leaving entry possible at a later 
stage, albeit at less-favorable terms at the margin. 
Capacity limits and demand requirements 
Another type of access contract specifies a capacity—i.e., a certain maximal number of 
firm 2 subscribers that this firm can access—for making a payment (in particular, a fixed 
fee F ). If firm 2  could mix the new and old technologies (a fraction of subscriptions to 
the old and another to the new), this can be seen as a commitment by firm 2  to de-
mand at least q . A higher quantity may be available for additional access payments. 
This means that marginal costs are higher for large quantities than for small ones; the 
opposite situation prevails with quantity discounts. 
In general, there are no clear-cut lessons concerning the implications of non-linear ac-
cess prices since results depend on the level q . If the capacity threshold is high relative 
to the realization of Nu  , then we expect competition to be more intense, while the op-
posite holds true for low capacity relative to the realization of Nu : Here, firm 2’s high 
marginal costs for quantities qq >2  lead to high retail prices. Advantages and disad-
vantage of an additional fixed fee F  were discussed above. 
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In practice, these kinds of contracts are also discussed with respect to (efficient) risk 
sharing between firms. The issues of risk sharing and, relatedly, the determination of 
the risk premium, depending on the types of contracting, and the chosen regulatory 
approach will be investigated in the following section. 
4 Risk averse firms and the risk premium 
4.1 Preliminary considerations 
Under risk aversion, a firm considers the expected cash flow to be less valuable if it is 
more risky.16 Put differently, because of uncertainty, the value of expected profits has to 
be adjusted downward; here, we abstract from the time dimension, which is the topic of 
Section 5. Modern capital market theory suggests, however, that firms should ask for a 
risk premium for systematic, but not for idiosyncratic, risk since the former increases the 
costs of capital. If this were the only reason for a risk premium, we would immediately 
obtain the following result: Risk sharing of the investment and the corresponding deter-
mination of, say, a fixed access charge F  are irrelevant from an efficiency point of 
view. Put differently, the premium required, in total, to afford the investment is the same 
no matter how the risk is shared between the two firms. 
This neutrality no longer holds if there are firm-specific reasons for risk aversion. The 
finance literature has identified a number of reasons why firms should be averse to idio-
syncratic risk.17 In particular, frictions in the capital market play a key role in explaining 
firms’ risk aversion. Broadly speaking, internal financing can be less “costly” than exter-
nal financing. The efficient risk sharing between investing and access-seeking firms, 
then, depends on the firms’ abilities to bear the risk of the investment and, in particular, 
on the firms’ external financing needs and their access to the capital market. This may 
depend on the particular company; however, these parameters are endogenous. Regu-
lation that conditions on these different abilities runs the risk of generating inefficiencies 
in the way that firms make their financing and other relevant firm decisions. In addition, 
financial intermediaries offer possible insurance mechanisms to firms.18 
 16 In our simple framework, we do not need to distinguish between cash flows and profits. 
 17 An overview and good access to this literature is provided by Ross et al. (2008). 
 18 In this section, we abstract from regulatory uncertainty. We could introduce regulatory uncertainty—in 
particular, after presenting our dynamic extension in the following section. The term “regulatory uncer-
tainty” refers to the uncertainty that prevails after existing regulation is revised. Given the long time 
horizon to recover investments in NGA networks, this is an important issue. To the extent that regula-
tory uncertainty is part of the general uncertainty, one has to ask to what extent it contributes to sys-
tematic risk and, thus, justifies a higher risk premium. However, regulatory risk can also mean that fu-
ture regulation is not a random event, but depends on market conditions. Using that definition, regula-
tion  responds in a predictable way to market outcomes and reduces expected profits of access-
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Risk profile with fixed and variable access fees 
Comparing contracts with a fixed fee F  to contracts with a variable fee that depends on 
the quantity—i.e., the number of subscribers (e.g., 2wq )—we obtain the following risk 
profiles for the two firms. Provided that—based on the ex-ante contracts offered—both 
firms offer the new technology, net profits with a fixed fee are 
)(),(1 FIuu
NN −−π  and .),(2 Fuu
NN −π     (14) 
With a linear access tariff, net profits are 
Iuuwqwuu NNNN −+ ),();,( 21π  and ).,();,( 22
NNNN uuwqwuu −π   (15) 
Abstracting initially from the implications of w  for quantities 1q  und 2q , and postulating 
that contracts require that each firm bears the investment cost in accordance with its 
share of subscribers in the retail market, the comparison plays out as follows. Replacing 
the fixed fee F  with the access price  rotates the profit function in terms of Nu . The 
investing firm obtains a relatively larger payment  for a high realization of Nu  and a 
relatively lower contribution to its investment cost with a low realization of Nu . Thus, its 
profit function becomes steeper in Nu . By contrast, the risk profile of the access-
seeking firm becomes flatter. 
Result 4: A variable access payment that increases in the number of subscribers, in-
stead of a fixed payment for access, shifts more risk to the investing firm. 
Figure 1 illustrates this finding. 
granting or access-seeking firms. In this paper, we do to address advantages and disadvantages of 
regulatory policies that provide commitment in the long term versus more-flexible regulatory policies. 
                                                                                                                                          
20 Uncertainty, investments and regulation of NGA 
 
Figure 1: Risk profile of the investing firm 
If the goal of regulation is to ensure a balanced allocation of risk to the two firms, our 
findings suggest (subject to the caveats on ex-ante access fees) that a fixed fee is de-
sirable. Thus, as long as no late entry can be expected and no foreclosure of small 
firms feared, this provides additional support for a fixed ex-ante fee. (Note that we have 
set marginal costs—i.e., costs per subscriber—equal to zero. If they are positive, the 
fixed fee has to be accompanied by a price per subscriber equal to marginal cost.) 
Risk profile with optional fees 
We extend our discussion to the case of optional fixed fees. As a first step, suppose 
that firms do not compete in the retail market because, for example, they serve distinct 
consumer groups. In this case, the risk profiles of the two firms—i.e., the shape of the 
profit function—is as follows. Recall that only firm 1  uses the new technology for low 
realizations of *uuN <  if the payment of F  is optional. Thus, firm 1  obtains F  as a 
contribution to its investment costs only if *uuN ≥ . 
Figure 2 illustrates the corresponding risk profile, which features a discontinuity at 
*uuN =  for firm 1 . Note that this figure illustrates an environment in which firms do not 
compete. Therefore, profits ),(2
ON uuπ  are constant in Nu , as the performance of the 
new technology is irrelevant for firm 2 if it has decided to continue using the old tech-
nology. The insight under no competition essentially carries over to market environ-
ments in which there is little competition, with only the modification that ),(2
ON uuπ  is 
decreasing in Nu , albeit not reacting much to . The shape of the profit function of 
firm 1  is similar; the jump at *uuN =  is a bit less pronounced.  
u 
N 
Profits i=1 (F) 
Profits i=1 (w) 
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Figure 2: Risk profile under weak competition 
If competition is intense, the picture may change dramatically, as depicted in Figure 3. 
In particular, firm 1’s risk profile looks drastically different. Here, intense competition 
makes realizations slightly below *uuN =  rather attractive for firm 1 , as it makes high 
profits when facing a competitor with poor quality. This means that the jump at *uuN =  
goes in the opposite direction. In the case of firm 2, the risk profile has the feature that 
),(2
ON uuπ  is decreasing in Nu , reacting strongly to changes in Nu , as its disad-
vantage becomes more and more pronounced for higher Nu . 
u N 
Profits i=2 
Profits i=1 
u N 
 
=  u* 
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Figure 3: Risk profile under strong competition 
Result 5: If the access contract consists of an optional fixed fee, the risk profile of the 
non-investing firm has the feature that its profits are decreasing in Nu  as long as it de-
cides not to take the option—i.e., *uu N < . Under intense competition, the risk profile 
may be non-monotone, and average profits for the investing firm for low realizations of 
*uu N <  may, in principle, be at a level similar to the average profits for high realization 
*uuN > . 
Based on the risk profiles, it is possible to calculate measures of risk, such as variance 
in numerical examples. It is even possible to calculate the extent to which the systemat-
ic risk is borne by the two firms (“cash-flow beta”), which can then be used to determine 
the investing firm’s risk premium. A computational approach in this direction appears to 
be interesting but is beyond the scope of the paper. 
5 Discussion: Dynamic access fees 
In this section, we include the time dimension in our discussion. Initially, we still sup-
pose that there is a single investment I  to be made. Firm 2  has to decide the point in 
time at which to start accessing the new technology.  
5.1 Access fees over time 
In this subsection, we postulate that there is a single investment period, which implies 
that the type of decision problem faced by firm 2  is the same as in the previous sec-
u N 
Profits i=2 
Profits i=1 
u 
N  
=  u* 
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tions. Profits following the investment occur over several periods ,...2,1=t . In every 
period, the market evolution for the new technology is captured by the realization 
)(tuN . For simplicity, we suppose that profits in period t  depend on )(tuN  and, if no 
access has taken place, Ou  which is independent of time. In particular, if both firms use 
the new technology in period t  given realization )(tuN , equilibrium profits in the retail 
market are ))(),(( tutu NNiπ . If only firm 1  uses the new technology, equilibrium profits 
in the retail market are )),(( ONi utuπ . 
Sharing the investment risk and dynamic efficiency 
For several reasons, a firm may be averse to idiosyncratic risk, even though, according 
to the standard approach (CAPM), this should not be the case. There may be benefits 
from cash-flow smoothing, as outside financing is costly due to capital market frictions. 
Consequently, the distribution of access revenues over time also may become an im-
portant determinant of investment decisions. 
First, we consider a deterministic fixed fee )(tF , which may vary over time. To use the 
new technology at time t , firm 2  has to pay )(tF . We postulate that the access deci-
sion is irreversible, in the sense that it is optimal to continue to use the new technology 
and pay )'(tF  for all tt >'  once it has been adopted by firm 2 . 
Thus, firm 2  has to determine the optimal point in time at which, depending on the mar-
ket development, it seeks access to the new technology. We stipulate that )(tuN  is 
weakly monotone over time since the ongoing development of new services increases 
consumers’ willingness to pay. If )(tF  is constant or decreasing over time, this implies 
that there is an optimal point in time *t  after which it is profit-maximizing for firm 2  to 
make the payment for access. The larger *t  is, the less efficient the outcome is. 
The problem of delayed adoption becomes more severe under uncertainty. Uncertainty 
over future realizations of )(tuN  makes waiting and using the old technology relatively 
more attractive.19 More uncertainty increases the value of waiting. Since, in our frame-
work, ON utu ≥)(  for all t , waiting is never socially efficient; however, it may occur in 
the market. This suggests that )(tF  should initially be low. To obtain the same cost 
contribution from the access-seeking firm, this may require that )(tF  must be larger in 
later periods. To the extent that an initially low )(tF  enables early adoption by firm 2 , 
this payment may be reduced in later periods, relative to an F  applied uniformly over 
all periods. Considering that )(tuN  is increasing over time and the uncertainty of reali-
zation )(tuN  is decreasing over time, back-loaded access fees may increase overall 
efficiency. Note, again, that for this argument, it is important that access is optional for 
 19 Determining the value for waiting due to uncertainty is an important contribution [of to?]the literature 
on real options; see, in particular, Dixit and Pindyck (1994). Guthrie (2006, 2012) discusses applying 
the real options approach to telecommunications. 
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firm 2 . Also note that to preserve firm 1’s incentives to invest, retail competition follow-
ing access should not be too intense (or it should be dampened through higher marginal 
charges). Otherwise, there may be failure to invest in the first place. Finally, note that 
the adoption of a per-subscriber fee )(tw  can, again, lead to a more efficient adoption 
of the new technology by firm 2 , as argued in Section 3. 
5.2 Dynamic investment paths 
We extend the previous analysis by allowing the investing firm to choose an investment 
path over time, )(tI . We extend our formal framework as follows: Denoting the spend-
ing on investment at time t  by )(tI , the overall investment volume is 
)(...)1()( tIItSI ++=  (for simplicity, we abstract from discounting). The consumer utili-
ty in period  now depends on the overall investment up until t , )(tSI . A high realiza-
tion of Nu  becomes more likely the higher )(tSI  is. In addition, the probability distribu-
tion over Nu  may depend not only on the investment level at point, t  but also on the 
exact time path. We discuss the latter issue below. 
Efficient investment path 
We explore how a dynamic access tariff—in the form of fixed fees )(tF , for example—
affects the investment path and its efficiency properties. On efficiency grounds, the op-
timal path )(tI  depends on various factors. Due to the irreversibility of the investment, 
there is, from an efficiency perspective, value to waiting, provided that the success of 
the new technology and, thus, the future path of )(tuN  is uncertain. However, early 
investments also make it possible to learn about future success.20 
We note that, with imperfect capital markets, the chosen investment path )(tI  may also 
depend on the financial resources available to the firm. In this case, high access pay-
ments (provided that the access-seeking firm makes use of the option to access the 
technology) may help the investing firm to finance the investment upfront and can be 
seen as a way to generate internal financing (in particular, if investments can be spread 
over time and space so that access payment in one region helps finance the investment 
in another region). 
Incentives for earlier investments 
The privately optimal investment path for firm 1  will typically differ from the socially effi-
cient path. As is well known, the investing firm is typically not able to extract all rents in 
the market, even if it finds itself in a monopoly position. In addition, in the presence of 
 20 Physical restrictions should also affect the maximal possible or (due to cost considerations) accepta-
ble speed of roll-out of the new technology. 
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imperfect competition, there is another party that may obtain some of the rents generat-
ed by the investment. 
To understand the forces at play, it is useful to first neglect the time dimension and al-
low the investing firm to decide on the scale of its investment. If the investment is not a 
simple yes/no decision but, rather, a decision of scale, variable access fees have an 
efficiency advantage over fixed fees (especially if paid ex ante). For simplicity, consider 
the extreme case in which firms do not compete in the retail market. With a fixed ex- 
ante access fee, the investing firm internalizes its own profits in the retail sector, plus 
the fixed contribution by the access-seeking firm, as long as contracting is incomplete 
with respect to the scale of the investment. To be more precise, absent competition, the 
investing firm’s profits are independent of the profits obtained by the access-seeking 
firm. By contrast, a variable access payment implies that the investing firm also benefits 
from a larger number of subscribers to the access-seeking firm as a result of its invest-
ment. 
If the scale of the investment is built up over time along an investment path, this com-
parison between variable and fixed access fees continues to apply. Here, a variable 
access fee may lead to quicker investments, as investment incentives are stronger, the 
greater the speed of the investment. Similarly, incentives along the investment path to 
invest earlier are strengthened as access payments are more front-loaded, as this al-
lows the investing firm to obtain a larger share of the surplus generated by the invest-
ment in early periods. 
The preceding discussion, however, presumes that the access payment depends only 
indirectly—i.e., through the structure of the access price—on investment volume and 
the investment path. Alternatively, fixed or variable payments could depend directly on 
the investment path—e.g., by applying ))(,( tItF  or ))(,( tItw . Bringing investments 
forward is then compensated by a higher ))(,( tItF  or ))(,( tItw  in early periods. As a 
larger investment increases realizations of )(tuN , the access-seeking firm may also 
seek early access. 
6 Concluding Remarks 
This paper provides a framework for exploring the allocative and welfare effects of vari-
ous access tariffs in an environment in which the value of the new technology is uncer-
tain and in which a firm has to make an investment decision and grant access to a 
competitor. Introducing uncertainty allows us to distinguish between two types of ex-
ante contracts: those that include non-optional access payments (co-investment) and 
those that allow the access-seeking firm to decide whether to use of the access option 
once the uncertainty has been resolved. We also consider ex-post contracts, which are 
signed after the investment has been made (and the uncertainty resolved). 
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We proceed in three steps: First we consider a world with uncertainty, in which an in-
vestment decision and an access decision are made only once, and firms are risk-
neutral. Second, we introduce risk aversion among firms. Third, returning to risk-neutral 
firms, we explore when the access-seeking firm chooses to access the new technology 
and the investing firm makes its investment(s). 
Our paper should be seen as explorative. We aim to highlight different forces at play 
without providing a full characterization of privately and socially optimal contracts. Also, 
by restricting ourselves to the use of reduced profit functions (albeit with a micro foun-
dation, which is provided in the Appendix), we could not explicitly provide parameter 
ranges for certain results to hold. The advantage of our framework is that it allows us to 
uncover various forces at play in a simple setting. However, by analyzing a fully speci-
fied model, it should be possible to obtain additional welfare results. 
Future work may want to develop tractable, micro-founded models that explicitly incor-
porate risk aversion arising from capital-market imperfections. It may also want to pay 
more attention to timing decisions by firms in a dynamic game. While we touch upon 
both issues in the two preceding sections, much work remains to be done in these di-
rections. 
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7 Appendix 
Here, we illustrate the insights derived in the main text by focusing on a particular mod-
el. The analysis in the main text relied on a reduced form, which allowed us to focus on 
the main mechanisms at play. Here, we provide a specific model that meets all the re-
duced-form assumptions in the main text. We rely on the adaptation of the standard 
Hotelling-duopoly provided in Inderst und Peitz (2012a). 
Competition for consumers: The standard case 
We consider competition between two horizontally differentiated firms in the Hotelling 
model with hinterlands. Firms are located at the extreme points of the -interval. 
Consumers are uniformly distributed on this interval. A consumer at location x  incurs 
disutility xτ  if she subscribes to firm 1 and )1( x−τ  if she subscribes to firm 2. Thus, the 
utility gross of the price is xu τ−1  if she subscribes to product 1 and )1(2 xu −−τ  if she 
subscribes to firm 2. The parameter  is a measure of the degree of product differentia-
tion and, thus, of the intensity of competition. 
The interval is populated by a mass M  of consumers. In addition, each firm has a hin-
terland with consumer mass im  which it serves exclusively. The hinterland includes 
consumers with particularly strong preferences for one of the two firms that are beyond 
reach for the competing firm; each firm operates as a monopolist in its own hinterland. 
Each firm does not know the location of consumers and also cannot discriminate be-
tween a consumer from its hinterland and a consumer from the imperfectly competitive 
segment. First, we consider the situation in which the number of viewers in the monopo-
ly segments is constant. In other words, the demand in the hinterland is perfectly price-
inelastic. We assume that the hinterland is sufficiently small, with the property that nei-
ther of the two firms has an incentive to extract the full surplus from the hinterland or to 
compete in the imperfectly competitive segment. 
Firm i  sets price ip . Thus, a consumer x  within the competitive segment obtains net 
neutrality 11 pxu −−τ  if she subscribes to firm 1 and 22 )1( pxu −−−τ  if she subscribes 
to firm 2. Firm i  incurs constant marginal costs of production ik . 
Old and new technology 
The starting point is the situation in which both firms can use the old technology with 
O
i uu = . If firm 1 has invested in the new technology, 
Nuu =1 . If firm 2 obtains access 
to firm 1’s new technology, Nuu =2 . 
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Competition in the standard model 
In the competitive segment, there is a consumer xˆ  who is indifferent between the two 
firms. It satisfies 1122 ˆ)ˆ1( pxupxu −−=−−− ττ . Solving for xˆ , we obtain 
( ) ( )[ ]221121 2
1
2
1),(ˆ pupuppx −−−+=
τ
     
In this segment, demand for operators 1 is xˆ  and demand for product 2 is xˆ1− .  
Thus, demands for firms 1 and 2 are 
xMmq ˆ11 +=  and ).ˆ1(22 xMmq −+=      
Profits of firm 1 (gross of any fixed costs) are 
).)(ˆ()( 1111111 kpxMmkpq −+=−=π      
Similarly, profits of firm 2 are: 
).))(ˆ1(()( 2222222 kpxMmkpq −−+=−=π      
Let us define parameters Mmm /ˆ 11 =  and Mmm /ˆ 22 = . We can then rewrite profit 
functions as 
))(ˆˆ( 1111 kpxmM −+=π  and ).))(ˆ1(ˆ( 2222 kpxmM −−+=π     
Maximizing profits with respect to price and rewriting the first-order conditions yields 
best-response functions 
[ ] .
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1ˆ 221111 puukmp +−+++= ττ      
and 
[ ] .
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1ˆ 112222 puukmp +−+++= ττ      
Nash equilibrium prices are: 
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The price difference in equilibrium is, therefore, 
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The price difference increases in the vertical differentiation 12 uu − , in the cost differ-
ence 12 kk − , and in the difference in the size of each firm’s hinterland 12 ˆˆ mm − . 
Equilibrium profits 
In equilibrium, the indifferent consumer is located at 
( ) ( ) ( ).ˆˆ
3
1
6
1
6
1
2
1ˆ 121212
* mmkkuux −+−+−−=
ττ
     
Using this expression, together with the expressions for equilibrium price, we obtain 
equilibrium profits 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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In particular, if firm 1 use the new technology, while firm uses the new one, equilibrium 
profits are 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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Extension: Price-dependent total demand 
The model from above has the property that the total number of active consumers is 
perfectly price-inelastic. Here, we sketch the extension with price-dependent hinter-
lands—i.e., we postulate that )( 11 pm  is decreasing in 1p  and )( 22 pm  decreasing in 
2p . 
To connect to the analysis in the main text, we introduce a linear access fee w  which 
gives rise to access revenues of firm 1 when investing and granting access. The profit 
function of firm  1 is 
1π ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )222111211 ,ˆ1,ˆ pmppxMkwpmppxMkp NN +−−++−=   
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )221111211 ,ˆ pmpmMkwpmppxMwp N ++−++−= .  (16) 
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Firm 2‘ profit function is 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ).,ˆ1 222122 pmppxMwp +−−=π      
Equilibrium prices *1p  and 
*
2p  depend on the access price w . In the case of perfectly 
price-inelastic hinterlands, we have 1/*2 =dwdp  und 1/
*
1 =dwdp  (see, in particular, de  
Bijl and Peitz, 2006). By contrast, with price-dependent hinterlands we have 
1/*2 <dwdp  since a price increase leads to lower demand in the monopoly segment of 
a firm. The latter implies that a higher (linear) access price for the new technology leads 
to lower profits of firm 2 and 1/*1 <dwdp (i.e., firm 2 passes an increase in access costs 
only partially on to consumers). 
The present model features an important asymmetry between firms: Firm 1 as the inte-
grated firm, does not have opportunity costs (depending on w ) if it sells its service to 
consumers in its own hinterland, )( 11 pm . By contrast, firm 2 has to pay the access price 
and, thus, incurs cost Nkw >  when selling to consumers in its hinterland, )( 22 pm . 
Consequently, firm 1 tends to set a lower price than firm 2 in equilibrium (see de Bijl und 
Peitz, 2006). Therefore, there is partial foreclosure, and a higher access price w  tends 
to lead to more-asymmetric market outcomes. This may further increase the 
deadweight loss. 
Introducing uncertainty and risk 
Suppose, now, that Nu  is drawn from the interval ],[ uuO  according to the cumulative 
distribution function )( NuG . For instance, with a fixed and non-optional access fee and  
Nkw = , firm i's expected profit (gross of investment cost and any fixed payments) is  
( ) .)(,∫
u
u
NNN
iA udGuuπ        
We note that, in the case of perfectly price-inelastic hinterlands, ),( NNi uuπ  is inde-
pendent of Nu . This implies that, consumers fully retain the higher consumer benefit 
due to a better technology. Hence, if a variable access markup is not allowed, a firm 
never has an incentive to invest in a technology that its competitor can use, as total 
industry profits are constant in Nu . Industry profits are no longer constant when de-
mand in the hinterlands is price-dependent, and a firm invests if investment costs are 
sufficiently low.21  
With )( NuG  and equilibrium profit and demand as functions of ),( 21 uu  as derived 
above, we have provided a specific model for the expressions used in the main text. 
 21 Another possibility to obtain non-constant industry profits is to assume that a better technology in-
creases horizontal differentiation between firms, i.e. τ is increasing in u . 
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They can also be used for numerical illustration when assigning value to the parameters 
of the model. 
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